United Nations A/71/966

General Assembly

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Seventy-first session
Agenda item 121
Revitalization of the work of the General Assembly

Revitalization of the work of the General Assembly

Report of the Secretary-General

Summary

The present report has been prepared in accordance with paragraph 5 (d) of the annex to General Assembly resolution 58/316. It contains the draft programme of work of the plenary for the seventy-second session of the General Assembly. The draft programmes of work of five of the six Main Committees of the Assembly, which were approved by the Assembly, can be found in the respective decisions of the Assembly. The status of documentation will be issued as an addendum to the present report.

17-10781 (E) 110717

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I. Introduction

1. The General Assembly, in paragraph 5 (d) of the annex to its resolution 58/316 on further measures for the revitalization of the work of the Assembly, decided that in July of each year the General Committee would conduct a review of the proposed programme of work for the forthcoming session of the Assembly, on the basis of a report submitted by the Secretary-General, and would also submit recommendations on the matter to the Assembly at its forthcoming session. The report would include information on the status of documentation to be issued during the forthcoming session.

2. The present report has been prepared in response to that request.

3. The draft programmes of work of the Main Committees, with the exception of the Fifth Committee,[1] have been approved by the respective Committees and were adopted by the General Assembly in the following decisions: First Committee (decision 71/518); Special Political and Decolonization Committee (Fourth Committee) (decision 71/522); Second Committee (decision 71/543); Third Committee (decision 71/538); and Sixth Committee (decision 71/528).

4. With a view to assisting the General Committee and the General Assembly in their efforts to maximize both effectiveness and efficiency, the present report contains the draft programme of work of the plenary for the seventy-second session. The draft programmes of the Main Committees are available in the respective decisions.

5. The status of documentation will be issued as an addendum to the present report.

II. Draft programme of work of the plenary for the seventy-second session of the General Assembly

First week (12-15 September)

Tuesday, 12 September p.m.	Opening of the session by the President of the General Assembly [1][2]
	Minute of silent prayer or meditation [2]
	Appointment of the members of the Credentials Committee [3 (a)]
Wednesday, 13 September	Meeting of the General Committee
Friday, 15 September	Organization of work, adoption of the agenda and allocation of items: first report of the General Committee [7]

[1] The Fifth Committee has not taken a decision on this matter.

[2] Items and their numbers cited herein are from the preliminary list of items to be included in the provisional agenda of the seventy-second session (A/72/50). All items are pending approval by the General Assembly at its seventy-second session for their inclusion in the agenda and allocation for consideration. Some items that are on the preliminary list but not reflected in this draft programme are omitted either in accordance with relevant resolutions and decisions of the Assembly or for scheduling at a later date.

Second week (18-22 September)

Tuesday, 19 September to Saturday, 23 September a.m. and p.m.	General debate [8][3]

Third week (25-29 September)

Monday, 25 September a.m. and p.m.	General debate [8]
Wednesday, 27 and Thursday, 28 September a.m. and p.m.	High-level meeting of the General Assembly on the appraisal of the United Nations Global Plan of Action to Combat Trafficking in Persons (resolution 71/287)

Fourth week (2-6 October)

	[Organizational, administrative and other matters]
Wednesday, 4 October a.m.	Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization [111]

Fifth week (9-13 October)

	[Promotion of sustained economic growth and sustainable development in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and recent United Nations conferences; Organizational, administrative and other matters]
Monday, 9 October	1. Report of the Economic and Social Council [9]; Integrated and coordinated implementation of and follow-up to the outcomes of the major United Nations conferences and summits in the economic, social and related fields [14]: *joint debate*
	2. Integrated and coordinated implementation of and follow-up to the outcomes of the major United Nations conferences and summits in the economic, social and related fields [14]; Follow-up to the outcome of the Millennium Summit [118]; Strengthening of the United Nations system [124 (a) and (b)]; United Nations reform: measures and proposals [125]: *joint debate*
	[Promotion of sustained economic growth and sustainable development in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and recent United Nations conferences]
Friday, 13 October	Sport for development and peace [11 (a) and (b)]

[3] As the first item before the opening of the general debate, the Secretary-General will present his report on the work of the Organization.

Sixth week (16-20 October)	
	[Organizational, administrative and other matters]
Monday, 16 October	Election of fifteen members of the Human Rights Council [115 (d)]
	[Promotion of justice and international law; Organizational, administrative and other matters]
Wednesday, 18 October p.m.	Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 [76]; International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals [130]: *joint debate*
	[Development of Africa; Promotion of sustained economic growth and sustainable development in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and recent United Nations conferences]
Friday, 20 October	New Partnership for Africa's Development: progress in implementation and international support [67 (a) and (b)]; 2001-2010: Decade to Roll Back Malaria in Developing Countries, Particularly in Africa [13]: *joint debate*
Seventh week (23-27 October)	
Tuesday, 24 October	*United Nations Day Concert*
	[Promotion of justice and international law]
Thursday, 26 October a.m.	Report of the International Court of Justice [75]
Eighth week (30 October-3 November)	
	[Promotion of justice and international law]
Monday, 30 October	Report of the International Criminal Court [77]
	[Maintenance of international peace and security]
Wednesday, 1 November	Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba [42]
	[Promotion of human rights]
Thursday, 2 November	Report of the Human Rights Council [68]
Ninth week (6-10 November)	
	[Organizational, administrative and other matters]
Thursday, 9 November	Election of five members of the International Court of Justice [114 (c)]
	[Disarmament]
Friday, 10 November	Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency [90]

Tenth week (13-17 November)	
	[Organizational, administrative and other matters]
Monday, 13 November	Implementation of the resolutions of the United Nations [121]; Revitalization of the work of the General Assembly [122]: *joint debate*
	[Organizational, administrative and other matters]
Thursday, 16 November	Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Security Council [123]
	[Organizational, administrative and other matters]
Friday, 17 November	1. Election of twenty members of the Committee for Programme and Coordination [115 (a)]
	2. Appointment of members of the Committee on Conferences [116 (f)]
	3. Interaction between the United Nations, national parliaments and the Inter-Parliamentary Union [127]
Eleventh week (20-24 November)	
	[Maintenance of international peace and security]
Monday, 20 November	The situation in Afghanistan [39]
Thursday, 23 November	*Official United Nations holiday (Thanksgiving)*
Twelfth week (27 November-1 December)	
	[Maintenance of international peace and security]
Wednesday, 29 November p.m. — Thursday, 30 November a.m. and p.m.	1. Question of Palestine [38]
	2. The situation in the Middle East [37]
Thirteenth week (4-11 December)	
	[Promotion of justice and international law]
Tuesday, 5 December	Oceans and the law of the sea [78 (a) and (b)]
	[Promotion of sustained economic growth and sustainable development in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and recent United Nations conferences; Organizational, administrative and other matters]
Wednesday, 6 December	1. Culture of peace [15]
	2. Global health and foreign policy [128]
	3. Investigation into the conditions and circumstances resulting in the tragic death of Dag Hammarskjöld and of the members of the party accompanying him [131]

	[Effective coordination of humanitarian assistance efforts]
Thursday, 7 December	Strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian and disaster relief assistance of the United Nations, including special economic assistance [74 (a) to (c)]
Monday, 11 December	Report of the Credentials Committee [3 (b)]
	Improving global road safety [12]
	Elimination of unilateral extraterritorial coercive economic measures as a means of political and economic compulsion [32]
	Support by the United Nations system of efforts of Governments to promote and consolidate new or restored democracies [33]
	The role of diamonds in fuelling conflict [34]
	Prevention of armed conflict [35 (a) and (b)]
	Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development [36]
	The situation in the occupied territories in Azerbaijan [40]
	Election of the Executive Director of the United Nations Human Settlements Programme [115 (b)]
	Election of two members of the Organizational Committee of the Peacebuilding Commission [115 (c)]
	Appointment of the judges of the United Nations Dispute Tribunal [116 (h)]
	International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 [129]
	Global awareness of the tragedies of irregular migrants in the Mediterranean basin, with specific emphasis on Syrian asylum seekers [132]
	(11 December: end of 13 weeks)

Plenary items not scheduled for consideration during the main part of the session

Election of the President of the General Assembly [4]

Election of the Vice-Presidents of the General Assembly [6]

Implementation of the Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS and the political declarations on HIV/AIDS [10]

Report of the Security Council [30] (see S/2015/944)

Report of the Peacebuilding Commission [31]; Peacebuilding and sustaining peace [66]; Report of the Secretary-General on the Peacebuilding Fund [112]: *joint debate*

Request for an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legal consequences of the separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965 [89]

Notification by the Secretary-General under Article 12, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations [113]

Election of five non-permanent members of the Security Council [114 (a)][4]

Election of eighteen members of the Economic and Social Council [114 (b)][4]

Approval of the appointment of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights [116 (g)]

The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy [119]

Commemoration of the abolition of slavery and the transatlantic slave trade [120]

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[4] The General Assembly, in its resolution 68/307, decided to conduct the elections of the non-permanent members of the Security Council and the members of the Economic and Social Council about six months before the elected members assume their responsibilities, beginning at the seventieth session.

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General Assembly

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Seventy-first session
Agenda item 68 (a)
Promotion and protection of human rights: implementation of human rights instruments

Letter dated 29 June 2017 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a statement delivered by the representative of the Russian Federation during the 27th meeting of States parties to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination under the agenda item on other matters (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the seventy-first session of the General Assembly under agenda item 68 (a).

(*Signed*) Petr **Ilichev**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

17-10983 (E) 030717 060717

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Annex to the letter dated 29 June 2017 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Statement delivered on 22 June 2017 by the representative of the Russian Federation during the 27th meeting of States parties to the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination under agenda item 6, "Other matters"

Chair,

We would like to take this opportunity to comment on certain aspects of the work of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, the oldest human rights treaty body. As at meetings of States parties to other international human rights treaties held last year, our proposals and comments are based on our own experience of interaction with the Committee.

First of all, we would like to note that the Russian Federation supports the work of the Committee and considers that any attempts to limit its competence as defined in the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, including in the settlement of disputes among States parties, are unacceptable. We are convinced that the provisions of the Convention concerning the powers of this specialized Committee must be respected just as strictly as the articles concerning specific human rights.

At the same time, the Committee's practices have become rather problematic. In our view, multilingualism has recently become one of the most pressing issues. Unfortunately, the United Nations Secretariat is being overly liberal in its interpretation of the provisions of General Assembly resolution 68/268, entitled "Strengthening and enhancing the effective functioning of the human rights treaty body system". In that regard, we would like to recall that, according to this document, States parties should be able to interact with the treaty bodies, without prejudice, in any of the six official languages of the United Nations. The fact that the treaty bodies use three official working languages does not rule out the inclusion of a fourth language, at the request of the State concerned. Furthermore, this language should be used not only during the Committee's dialogue with a national interministerial delegation, but also during meetings with civil society institutions.

Chair,

In early August 2017, the twenty-third and twenty-fourth periodic reports of the Russian Federation on the implementation of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racism will be considered at the ninety-third session of the Committee. In this regard, we expect Russian interpretation to be provided at all stages of the presentation of Russian reports. Otherwise, a situation could arise in which the Committee's experts will have to rely solely on information from major international non-governmental organizations, but the positions of civil society representatives working directly on the ground will remain unheard.

Unlike the other treaty bodies, this Committee has a highly questionable practice whereby the list of themes in relation to a periodic report is sent to the reporting State less than two months before the forthcoming presentation. As a result, the interministerial delegation does not have sufficient time to prepare substantive replies, which clearly does not meet the objective of a constructive dialogue between the Committee and the State concerned.

Chair,

In conclusion, we would like to draw attention to the initiative launched by the Committee to establish a single inter-committee working group on individual communications. What are the legal grounds for this proposal? The advisability of this process is also highly doubtful, given the different substantive and objective content of the relevant conventions, as well as the different numbers of States parties.

Thank you.

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Security Council

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General Assembly
Seventy-first session
Agenda item 31
Prevention of armed conflict

Security Council
Seventy-second year

Letter dated 26 June 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to enclose herewith a commentary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine on the unauthorized visit of the Russian delegation to the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea (Ukraine) on 24 June 2017 (see annex).

I would appreciate your kind assistance in having the present letter and its annex distributed as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 31, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Volodymyr **Yelchenko**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

17-11015 (E) 050717

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Annex to the letter dated 26 June 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Commentary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine on yet another unauthorized visit of the Russian delegation headed by the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, to the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea (Ukraine) on 24 June 2017

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine expresses its strong protest against yet another visit of the Russian delegation led by the President, Vladimir Putin, on 24 June 2017 to the territory of Ukraine that has been temporarily occupied by the Russian Federation, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (Ukraine).

Ukraine considers the above-mentioned visit and other so-called "trips" of Russian officials to the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (Ukraine) to be a gross violation of the State sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine and a cynical and demonstrative negation by Russia of generally accepted norms of international law, including the Charter of the United Nations and General Assembly resolutions 68/262 entitled "Territorial integrity of Ukraine", of 27 March 2014, and 71/205 entitled "Situation of human rights in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (Ukraine)", of 19 December 2016, as well as obligations under bilateral and multilateral treaties to which Ukraine and Russia are parties.

A note of protest has been sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.

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General Assembly

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Seventy-first session
Agenda item 87
Request for an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legal consequences of the separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965

Note verbale dated 28 June 2017 from the Permanent Mission of the United Arab Emirates to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

The Permanent Mission of the United Arab Emirates to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honour to transmit herewith an explanation of vote of the United Arab Emirates on General Assembly resolution 71/292, entitled "Request for an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legal consequences of the separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965", adopted on 22 June 2017 (see annex).

The Permanent Mission of the United Arab Emirates to the United Nations would be grateful if the present note verbale and its annex could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 87.

17-11101 (E) 060717

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Annex to the note verbale dated 28 June 2017 from the Permanent Mission of the United Arab Emirates to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Explanation of vote of the United Arab Emirates on General Assembly resolution 71/292, entitled "Request for an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legal consequences of the separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965"

On 22 June 2017, the United Arab Emirates voted in favour of resolution 71/292, entitled "Request for an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legal consequences of the separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965".

At the outset, the United Arab Emirates encourages all parties involved in disputes to continue dialogue in good faith so as to reach a peaceful settlement. Nevertheless, the United Arab Emirates believes that the General Assembly can benefit from the guidance of the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. An advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice offers practical assistance to allow the parties to move forward if they are unable to reach a bilateral agreement. Although we remain fully cognizant of the important security interests of the United Kingdom and the United States in the Indian Ocean, which should be taken into consideration, we felt compelled to vote in favour of the resolution.

Our decision to vote in favour of the aforementioned resolution is based on our respect for States' claims to sovereignty, the efforts of both parties to seek a peaceful settlement of the dispute and our firm belief in the importance of the advisory role of the International Court of Justice, particularly as a mechanism to assist in the peaceful resolution of situations of international importance when negotiations between States fail.

The United Arab Emirates has first-hand experience to draw from in this regard. The United Arab Emirates rejects the illegal occupation of the three islands of Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa in the Arabian Gulf by Iran in 1971. Iran has historically rejected, and to this day continues to reject, all calls by the United Arab Emirates for bilateral negotiation, instead engaging in acts of provocation contrary to international law and common human values. The United Arab Emirates continues to call upon its neighbour Iran to return the three islands of Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa to their rightful owners, either voluntarily or through peaceful means, particularly through arbitration or the International Court of Justice.

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General Assembly
Security Council

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General Assembly
Seventy-first session
Agenda item 31
Prevention of armed conflict

Security Council
Seventy-second year

Letter dated 5 July 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon the instructions of my Government, I transmit herewith for your attention the record of the ceasefire violations by the Azerbaijani armed forces during the month of June 2017 (see annex I).*

I also transmit herewith for your attention the record of ceasefire violations registered by the Ministry of Defence of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic during the month of June 2017 (see annex II).*

I kindly request that the present letter and its annexes be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 31, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Zohrab **Mnatsakanyan**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

* Circulated in the language of submission only.

17-11347 (E) 110717

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Annex I to the letter dated 5 July 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan along the State border with the Republic of Armenia

1-30 June 2017

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons shots*
1 June	Tavush, Gegharkunik regions	9	Small arms and light weapons: 264
	Aygedzor	2	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 15
	Movses	2	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 1 (Aygedzor 1)
	Sevkar	1	Large-calibre machine guns: 77
	Voskevan	1	
	Koti	1	
	Jil	1	
	Chambarak	1	
2 June	Tavush region	6	Small arms and light weapons: 48
	Aygedzor	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 7
	Chinari	3	
	Aygepar	1	
	Vazashen	1	
3 June	Tavush region	9	Small arms and light weapons: 86
	Chinari	5	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 5
	Paravakar	2	Large-calibre machine guns: 20
	Kayan	1	
	Berekamavan	1	
4 June	Tavush, Ararat, Vayots Dzor, Syunik regions	8	Small arms and light weapons: 107
	Chinari	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 10
	Movses	2	Large-calibre machine guns: 5
	Kayan	1	
	Yeraskh	1	
	Khndzorut	2	
	Shaghat	1	

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons shots*
5 June	Tavush, Syunik, Gegharkunik regions	15	Small arms and light weapons: 394
	Aygedzor	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 15
	Chinari	2	Large-calibre machine guns: 60
	Paravakar	1	Grenade launchers: 7
	Aygepar	3	
	Movses	1	
	Barekamavan	1	
	Chapni	1	
	Artanish	1	
	Kutakan	1	
	Chambarak	1	
	Paruyr Sevak	1	
	Yeraskh	1	
6 June	Tavush, Gegharkunik, Ararat regions	9	Small arms and light weapons: 144
	Chinari	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 15
	Paravakar	3	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 40
	N. Karmiraghbyur	1	Large-calibre machine guns: 4 (Berkaber 4)
	Vazashen	1	
	Berkaber	2	
	Paruyr Sevak	1	
7 June	Tavush, Gegharkunik, Ararat regions	5	Small arms and light weapons: 55
	Aygedzor	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 37
	Jil	2	
	Chambarak	1	
	Paruyr Sevak	1	
8 June	Tavush, Gegharkunik regions	14	Small arms and light weapons: 306
	Chinari	2	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 16
	Movses	3	Large-calibre machine guns: 201
	Voskepar	1	
	Koti	5	
	Voskevan	2	
	Chambarak	1	

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons shots*
9 June	Tavush, Vayots Dzor, Syunik, Gegharkunik regions	19	Small arms and light weapons: 604
	Paravakar	2	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 11 (Chapni 10; Kayan 1)
	Movses	1	Large-calibre machine guns: 233
	Vazashen	3	
	Sevkar	1	
	Kayan	1	
	Baghanis	2	
	Koti	2	
	Berdavan	1	
	Voskevan	2	
	Khndzorut	1	
	Chapni	1	
	Chambarak	2	
10 June	Tavush, Gegharkunik, Ararat regions	8	Small arms and light weapons: 75
	Chinari	2	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 5
	Aygedzor	1	
	Tsapatagh	1	
	Artanish	1	
	Jil	1	
	Paruyr Sevak	1	
	Yeraskh	1	
11 June	Tavush, Gegharkunik regions	11	Small arms and light weapons: 100
	Chinari	5	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 6
	Aygedzor	2	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 2 (Chinari 2)
	Movses	2	
	Kakhakn	1	
	Artanish	1	
12 June	Tavush, Syunik regions	15	Small arms and light weapons: 126
	Chinari	3	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 18
	Movses	3	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 11 (Chapni 10; Paravakar 1)
	Berkaber	2	Large-calibre machine guns: 80
	Kayan	1	
	Barekamavan	1	

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons shots*
	Dovegh	1	
	Koti	2	
	Berdavan	1	
	Chapni	1	
13 June	Tavush, Gegharkunik, Ararat, Vayots Dzor regions	11	Small arms and light weapons: 98 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 5
	Chinari	1	
	Aygedzor	4	
	Paravakar	1	
	Chambarak	1	
	Artanish	1	
	Yeraskh	2	
	Khndzorut	1	
14 June	Tavush, Gegharkunik, Syunik regions	9	Small arms and light weapons: 170 Large-calibre machine guns: 15
	Chinari	1	
	Paravakar	4	
	Aygepar	1	
	Vazashen	1	
	Artanish	1	
	Kutakan	1	
15 June	Tavush, Gegharkunik, Ararat regions	16	Small arms and light weapons: 371 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 6 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 29 (Daranak 10; Chinari 11; Paravakar 8)
	Chinari	9	
	Paravakar	2	
	Kakhakn	1	
	Jil	1	
	Daranak	2	
	Yeraskh	1	
16 June	Tavush region	6	Small arms and light weapons: 139 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 18 (Barekamavan 18)
	Chinari	1	
	Paravakar	1	
	Kayan	1	
	Barekamavan	2	
	Baghanis	1	

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons shots*
17 June	Tavush, Syunik, Gegharkunik regions	12	Small arms and light weapons: 85
	Kolagir	2	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 23
	Chinari	1	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 12 (Paravakar 12)
	Paravakar	3	Large-calibre machine guns: 10
	N.Karmiraghbyur	1	Grenade launchers: 1
	Vazashen	1	
	Barekamavan	1	
	Koti	1	
	Shaghat	1	
	Jil	1	
18 June	Tavush region	3	Small arms and light weapons: 4
	Aygedzor	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 22
	Chinari	1	
	Dovegh	1	
19 June	Tavush, Vayots Dzor, Gegharkunik regions	11	Small arms and light weapons: 91
			Small-calibre sniper weapons: 8
	Aygedzor	3	Large-calibre machine guns: 20
	Chinari	2	
	Paravakar	2	
	Movses	1	
	Khndzorut	1	
	Vahan	1	
	Chambarak	1	
20 June	Tavush, Gegharkunik regions	9	Small arms and light weapons: 215
	Chinari	3	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 2
	Aygepar	3	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 7 (Artanish 5; Chinari 2)
	Paravakar	2	
	Artanish	1	
21 June	Tavush, Vayots Dzor regions	4	Small arms and light weapons: 20
	Aygedzor	2	
	Chinari	1	
	Khndzorut	1	

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons shots*
22 June	Tavush, Ararat regions	12	Small arms and light weapons: 163
	Aygedzor	2	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 6
	Chinari	3	Large-calibre machine guns: 16
	Aygepar	2	
	Paravakar	2	
	Movses	1	
	Vazashen	1	
	Yeraskh	1	
23 June	Tavush region	31	Small arms and light weapons: 700
	Chinari	10	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 33
	Kolagir	2	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 13 (Chinari 4; Vazashen 9)
	Aygedzor	4	Large-calibre machine guns: 24
	Movses	4	
	Aygepar	1	
	Paravakar	1	
	Vazashen	4	
	Barekamavan	5	
24 June	Tavush, Gegharkunik regions	14	Small arms and light weapons: 177
	Chinari	2	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 28
	Paravakar	2	
	Aygepar	3	
	N. Karmiraghbyur	1	
	Vazashen	3	
	Berdavan	1	
	Jil	1	
	Ttujur	1	
25 June	Tavush, Gegharkunik regions	20	Small arms and light weapons: 752
	Chinari	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 2
	Aygedzor	3	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 16 (Barekamavan 16)
	Movses	2	Large-calibre machine guns: 100
	N. Karmiraghbyur	2	
	Aygepar	1	
	Barekamavan	6	
	Berdavan	3	

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons shots*
	Vahan	1	
	Jil	1	
26 June	Tavush, Gegharkunik, Ararat regions	9	Small arms and light weapons: 138
	Paravakar	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 10
	Movses	3	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 3 (Jil 3)
	Aygepar	1	
	Pambak	1	
	Jil	2	
	Yeraskh	1	
27 June	Tavush, Gegharkunik regions	7	Small arms and light weapons: 35
	Aygedzor	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 13
	Aygepar	4	Small-calibre mortars: 3 (Chambarak 3)
	Movses	1	
	Chambarak	1	
28 June	Tavush, Gegharkunik, Ararat, Vayots Dzor regions	14	Small arms and light weapons: 240
	Chinari	4	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 11
	Aygedzor	4	Large-calibre machine guns: 45
	Geghamasar	1	
	Kolagir	1	
	Barekamavan	2	
	Zangakatun	1	
	Khndzorut	1	
29 June	Tavush, Gegharkunik, Ararat regions	31	Small arms and light weapons: 561
	Chinari	4	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 26
	Aygedzor	2	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 8 (Barekamavan 8)
	Movses	3	Large-calibre machine guns: 155
	Aygepar	4	
	N. Karmiraghbyur	12	
	Barekamavan	1	
	Berdavan	1	
	Dovegh	1	
	Kutakan	1	
	Vahan	1	
	Paruyr Sevak	1	

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons shots*
30 June	Tavush, Ararat regions	8	Small arms and light weapons: 56
	Aygedzor	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 21
	Aygepar	2	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 2 (Aygedzor 2)
	Movses	4	
	Jil	1	

During the reporting period, one soldier of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Armenia was wounded by fire from the Azerbaijani side.

Annex II to the letter dated 5 July 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan on the line of contact with the Nagorno Karabakh Republic

1-30 June 2017

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons shots*
1 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	44	Small arms and light weapons: 316
			Small-calibre sniper weapons: 7
			Large-calibre sniper weapons: 124 (Mehdili 44; Nuzger 74; Seysulan 4; Levonarkh 2)
			Grenade launchers: 5
			Small-calibre mortars: 6 (Kurapatkino 6)
2 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	37	Small arms and light weapons: 1,277
			Small-calibre sniper weapons: 26
			Large-calibre sniper weapons: 34 (Karakhanbeyli 4; Yusifjanli 24; Verin Chaylu 6)
			Large-calibre machine guns: 12
			Grenade launchers: 2
			Small-calibre mortars: 1 (Yarmja 1)
3 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	45	Small arms and light weapons: 896
			Small-calibre sniper weapons: 20
			Large-calibre sniper weapons: 21 (Mehdili 2; m.Karachuk 1; Yusifjanli 15; Dastagir 3)
			Large-calibre machine guns: 15
			Grenade launchers: 4
			Small-calibre mortars: 4 (Verin Chaylu 4)
4 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	28	Small arms and light weapons: 214
			Small-calibre sniper weapons: 52
			Large-calibre sniper weapons: 25 (Horadiz 3; Korgan 11; Gyulistan 3; Yanshak 8)
			Small-calibre mortars: 3 (Ashaghi Veysali 3)
5 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	27	Small arms and light weapons: 953
			Small-calibre sniper weapons: 34
			Large-calibre sniper weapons: 6 (Gyulistan 3; Marzili 3)

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons shots*
6 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	18	Small arms and light weapons: 932
			Small-calibre sniper weapons: 8
			Large-calibre sniper weapons: 20 (Yanshak 20)
			Large-calibre machine guns: 115
7 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	28	Small arms and light weapons: 815
			Small-calibre sniper weapons: 33
			Large-calibre sniper weapons: 29 (Mehdili 4; Ashaghi Veysali 5; Gjulistan 20)
			Large-calibre machine guns: 100
			Small-calibre mortars: 5 (Verin Chaylu 5)
8 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	21	Small arms and light weapons: 435
			Small-calibre sniper weapons: 5
			Large-calibre sniper weapons: 1 (Jraberd 1)
9 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	31	Small arms and light weapons: 7,395
			Small-calibre sniper weapons: 37
			Large-calibre sniper weapons: 14 (Ashaghi Veysali 14)
			Large-calibre machine guns: 25
			Grenade launchers: 10
10 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	51	Small arms and light weapons: 1,013
			Small-calibre sniper weapons: 16
			Large-calibre sniper weapons: 31 (Mehdili 8; Seysulan 20; Gyulistan 3)
			Large-calibre machine guns: 50
			Grenade launchers: 3
			Small-calibre mortars: 17 (Karakhanbeyli 3; Kurapatkino 14)
11 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	39	Small arms and light weapons: 719
			Small-calibre sniper weapons: 8
			Small-calibre mortars: 23 (Taghibeyli 6; Verin Chaylu 12; Gjulistan 2; Dastagir 3)
12 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	36	Small arms and light weapons: 448
			Small-calibre sniper weapons: 11
			Large-calibre sniper weapons: 4 (Karakhanbeyli 4)
13 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	21	Small arms and light weapons: 289
			Large-calibre sniper weapons: 3 (Taghibeyli 3)

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons shots*
14 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	23	Small arms and light weapons: 185 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 9 Large-calibre machine guns: 10 Small-calibre mortars: 8 (Verin Chaylu 8)
15 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	32	Small arms and light weapons: 628 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 88 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 4 (Chakhrli 4) Small-calibre mortars: 2 (Yarmja 2)
16 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	38	Small arms and light weapons: 622 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 18
17 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	40	Small arms and light weapons: 773 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 4 Large-calibre machine guns: 45 Grenade launchers: 5 Small-calibre mortars: 6 (Kurapatkino 2; Marzili 4)
18 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	75	Small arms and light weapons: 601 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 16 (Marzili 16) Grenade launchers: 18 Small-calibre mortars: 42 (Horadiz 16; Nuzger 4; Ashaghi Abdurakhmanli 1; Marzili 19; Seysulan 2)
19 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	42	Small arms and light weapons: 668 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 19 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 34 (Kurapatkino 3; m.Mrov 11; Choporlu 20)
20 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	35	Small arms and light weapons: 380 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 27 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 4 (Verin Chaylu 4)
21 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	34	Small arms and light weapons: 695 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 15 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 26 (Mehdili 9; Ashaghi Seydakhmedli 13; Ashaghi Veysali 1; Gjulistan 3) Small-calibre mortars: 16 (Kurapatkino 3; Seysulan 7; Verin Chaylu 6)

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons shots*
22 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	35	Small arms and light weapons: 320
			Small-calibre sniper weapons: 21
			Large-calibre sniper weapons: 2 (Ashagh Veysali 1; Verin Chaylu 1)
			Small-calibre mortars: 17 (Marzili 8; Kurapatkino 1; Verin Chaylu 8)
23 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	54	Small arms and light weapons: 1,377
			Small-calibre sniper weapons: 41
			Large-calibre sniper weapons: 24 (Horadiz 1; Sarijanli 20; Shikhlyar 1; Verin Chaylu 2)
			Large-calibre machine guns: 50
			Grenade launchers: 7
			Small-calibre mortars: 4 (Kurapatkino 1; Namerli 3)
24 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	47	Small arms and light weapons: 760
			Small-calibre sniper weapons: 35
			Large-calibre sniper weapons: 3 (Nuzger 3)
			Large-calibre machine guns: 57
			Grenade launchers: 19
			Small-calibre mortars: 16 (Kurapatkino 11; Jraberd 5)
25 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	28	Small arms and light weapons: 231
			Small-calibre sniper weapons: 21
			Large-calibre sniper weapons: 6 (m.Karachuk 1; Yusifjanli 1; Marzili 1; Gyulistan 3)
			Large-calibre machine guns: 14
			Grenade launchers: 3
			Small-calibre mortars: 6 (Darchinar 3; Ashagu Abdurakhmanli 2; Karakhanbeyli 1)
26 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	28	Small arms and light weapons: 437
			Small-calibre sniper weapons: 26
			Large-calibre sniper weapons: 10 (Marzili 10)
			Large-calibre machine guns: 5
			Grenade launchers: 1
			Small-calibre mortars: 5 (Ashaghi Seydakhmedli 5)
27 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	29	Small arms and light weapons: 454
			Small-calibre sniper weapons: 8
			Small-calibre mortars: 1 (Darchinar 1)

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons shots*
28 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	37	Small arms and light weapons: 325 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 24 Large-calibre machine guns: 12 Small-calibre mortars: 4 (Mehdili 2; Talish 2)
29 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	29	Small arms and light weapons: 527 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 10 Large-calibre machine guns: 10 Small-calibre mortars: 2 (Marzili 2)
30 June	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan	37	Small arms and light weapons: 1,210 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 36 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 10 (Korgan 4; Marzili 5; Yanshak 1) Large-calibre machine guns: 54 Grenade launchers: 5

During the reporting period, four soldiers of the Nagorno Karabakh Defence Army were killed and five soldiers were wounded by fire from the Azerbaijani side.

United Nations A/71/971–S/2017/577

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
6 July 2017

Original: English

General Assembly
Seventy-first session
Agenda item 32
Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development

Security Council
Seventy-second year

Identical letters dated 4 July 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Georgia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith the statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia on the illegal installation of a so-called border sign across the occupation line in the Tskhinvali region, dated 4 July 2017 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex issued as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 32, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Kaha **Imnadze**
Permanent Representative

17-11376 (E) 100717

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Annex to the identical letters dated 4 July 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Georgia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia on the illegal installation of a so-called border sign across the occupation line in the Tskhinvali region

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia expresses its deep concern over the illegal installation of a so-called border sign across the occupation line in the Tskhinvali region, in the area of Bershueti village, Gori district, as a result of which several local farmers' agricultural lands have now partially fallen beyond the occupation line.

This is a continuation of the illegal process of so-called "borderization", which not only restricts the fundamental rights of local residents, but considerably damages the security situation on the ground and obstructs Georgia's efforts to achieve a peaceful resolution of the conflict.

Despite the international community's repeated calls, the Russian Federation continues to grossly violate the principles of international law and its commitments undertaken under the ceasefire agreement of 12 August 2008.

This fact and the general situation in Georgia's occupied regions and adjacent territories once again point to the necessity of establishing international security arrangements and creating human rights monitoring mechanisms on the ground.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia calls upon the international community to duly assess the situation in Georgia's occupied territory and take respective measures to stop Russia's illegal actions. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia will use all levers at its disposal, including within the framework of the Geneva international discussions and international organizations, not to let the aforesaid action of Russia remain without due international assessment and reaction.

United Nations A/71/972–S/2017/582

General Assembly
Security Council

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11 July 2017
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Original: Arabic

General Assembly
Seventy-first session
Agenda item 108
Measures to eliminate international terrorism

Security Council
Seventy-second year

Identical letters dated 6 July 2017 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I should like to convey to you the following information:

In recent days, Turkish forces yet again infiltrated the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic in several parts of country, including, in particular, the areas of I'zaz, Jibrin and Akhtarin in the northern countryside of Aleppo. This action is a continuation of the policy being implemented by the Erdoğan regime in Syrian territory, one that is founded on aggression and expansionistic illusions. In previous identical letters, Syria explained that Turkey is occupying its territory and using armed force against it. It also spelled out how the Erdoğan regime is supporting armed terrorist groups by providing them with shelter, training and weapons, and explained that the regime had begun building walls in several areas along the length of the Syrian border, grabbing vast swathes of the Syrian Arab Republic from Syrian farmers in those areas.

The Erdoğan regime's actions blatantly violate international law, Security Council resolutions concerning Syria and the letter and spirit of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. The regime's actions blatantly violate, in particular, the relevant Security Council resolutions, which reaffirm the sovereignty of the Syrian Arab Republic and the unity of its territory and people. The recent Turkish aggression is in keeping with the destructive role being played by the Turkish Government in Syria. It makes Turkey a key partner in the terrorism and plots that are being directed against Syria and a serious threat to regional and international security and stability.

The international community understands that what the region does not need is further complication and more terrorism and destruction. Accordingly, the Syrian Arab Republic, which has repeatedly warned against the Turkish regime's dangerous policies, calls on the international community to stand up to, respond and condemn the destructive actions of Turkey. The Syrian Arab Republic reiterates that its people and army are determined to use every means available in order to defend every inch

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of its territory and confront the takfirist terrorism that is backed and espoused by the Erdoğan regime.

The continued silence of the Security Council regarding the practices and policies of the regime of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan will increase that regime's recklessness and its defiance of the will of the international community, which seeks to end swiftly the Syrian crisis and restore security and stability to the region.

I should be grateful if the present letter could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 108, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mounzer **Mounzer**
Minister Plenipotentiary
Chargé d'affaires a.i

United Nations A/71/973–S/2017/585

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Security Council

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7 July 2017

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General Assembly
Seventy-first session
Agenda items 32 and 37

Security Council
Seventy-second year

Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development

The situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan

Letter dated 5 July 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

In accordance with instructions received from my Government, I have the honour to draw your attention to the latest armed provocation by the Republic of Armenia.

On 4 July 2017, the armed forces of Armenia multiply violated the ceasefire, subjecting the armed forces of Azerbaijan along the front line and the nearby inhabited areas to intensive fire with 82- and 120-mm mortars and heavy grenade launchers. As a result of Armenia's attacks, a 51-year-old resident of the village of Alkhanli of the Fizuli district of Azerbaijan, Sahiba Guliyeva, and her 2-year-old granddaughter, Zahra Guliyeva, were killed, and another woman, 52-year-old Sarvinaz Guliyeva, was seriously wounded, while the civilian objects were substantially damaged.

It should be particularly noted that the aforementioned village is situated 4.5-5 km away from the front line, and this very fact, alongside other evidence, proves that the civilians and the civilian objects there were targeted by the armed forces of Armenia directly and deliberately, in blatant violation of international humanitarian law and international human rights law.

The Office of the Public Prosecutor of the Fizuli district of Azerbaijan instituted criminal proceedings for the commission of a crime under the Criminal Code of the Republic of Azerbaijan.

This is not the first instance of such despicable and hateful acts by the Armenian side. Their recurrence would not be possible without the sense of impunity that Armenia enjoys despite its persistent violations of international law and contempt for human rights.

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The war waged by Armenia against Azerbaijan has claimed the lives of tens of thousands of people, ruined cities and livelihoods in the country and resulted in the forcible expulsion of more than 1 million Azerbaijanis from their homes and properties. Serious violations of international humanitarian law amounting to war crimes, crimes against humanity and acts of genocide were committed by the Armenian side in the course of its aggression against Azerbaijan. Such violations include, inter alia, direct and indiscriminate attacks against civilians, the killing of civilians, the taking and holding of hostages, the mistreatment and summary execution of prisoners of war and hostages, sexual violence, the extensive destruction of inhabited areas and public and private property, pillaging and forced displacement.

In 1992, as a result of the attack and capture of the town of Khojaly, in the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan, by the Armenian armed forces, hundreds of Azerbaijanis, including women, children and the elderly, were killed, wounded or taken hostage, while the town was razed to the ground. What happened in Khojaly was the largest massacre in the conflict (see A/71/782-S/2017/110).

Despite the establishment of a ceasefire, attacks on the towns and villages in Azerbaijan situated along the front line of the armed forces of Armenia and Azerbaijan and the border between the two States, have become more frequent and violent in recent times, resulting in the killing and wounding of Azerbaijani servicemen and civilians.

Thus, a 9-year-old resident of the village of Orta Garvand of the Aghdam district of Azerbaijan, Fariz Badalov, was shot dead by an Armenian sniper on 8 March 2011 (see A/65/780-S/2011/132 and A/65/821-S/2011/251); a 13-year-old resident of the village of Alibayli of the Tovuz district of Azerbaijan, Aygun Shahmaliyeva, was killed and her mother, Elnara Shahmaliyeva, was seriously wounded on 14 July 2011 (see A/65/915-S/2011/457).

In the beginning of April 2016, the armed forces of Armenia increased fighting from their positions in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan, subjecting the armed forces of Azerbaijan along the front line and the adjacent densely populated areas to intensive fire with heavy artillery and large-calibre weapons. As a result of Armenia's attacks, 34 towns and villages in Azerbaijan were shelled, causing casualties among civilians and the servicemen of the armed forces of Azerbaijan as well as destroying or substantially damaging private and public property, including residences, schools and kindergartens (see A/70/838-S/2016/363, A/70/842-S/2016/370 and A/71/782-S/2017/110).

Against the background of its persistent refusal to engage in substantive and results-oriented negotiations on the political resolution of the conflict, the provocative actions of the Armenian side is yet further proof of Yerevan's deliberate attempts to escalate the situation on the ground and obstruct the peace process.

The responsibility for the killing and wounding of the residents of the village of Alkhanli in the Fizuli district of Azerbaijan on 4 July 2017, for committing other heinous crimes against the citizens of Azerbaijan during the conflict and for the consequences of such actions lies completely on the Republic of Armenia, including the President and Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of Armenia, Serzh Sargsyan.

The unlawful presence of the armed forces of Armenia in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan is the main cause of tensions and incidents that claim human lives and cause suffering in the conflict zone and the major impediment to the political settlement of the conflict.

The Government of the Republic of Azerbaijan calls upon the United Nations and Governments to strongly condemn the Republic of Armenia for deliberate attacks on Azerbaijani civilians, demand that those responsible for such acts be brought to justice, commit the leadership of Armenia to cease further provocative actions and hostile policy, comply fully with its international obligations, put a prompt end to its aggression and immediately, completely and unconditionally withdraw its armed forces from the Nagorno-Karabakh region and other occupied territories of Azerbaijan.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 32 and 37, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Yashar **Aliyev**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations A/71/974–S/2017/584

General Assembly
Security Council

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General Assembly
Seventy-first session
Agenda item 41
Question of Cyprus

Security Council
Seventy-second year

Letter dated 30 June 2017 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 30 June 2017, addressed to you by Mehmet Dânâ, Representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (see annex).

I should be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 41, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Başak **Yalçın**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

17-11462 (E) 120717

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 30 June 2017 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I am writing in response to the letter dated 19 June 2017 addressed to you by the Greek Cypriot representative in New York and circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council (S/2017/519), which yet again contains false assertions similar to those made in his previous letters. In order to set the record straight, I would like to bring the following to your kind attention.

At the outset, regarding the claims of so-called "infringements of international air traffic regulations" and "violations of the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by Turkey", I wish, once again, to reiterate that flights within the sovereign airspace of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus take place with the full knowledge and consent of the relevant authorities of the State, over which the Greek Cypriot administration in South Cyprus has no jurisdiction or right of say whatsoever. The civil aviation authority of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is the sole competent authority to provide air traffic and aeronautical information services within its own national airspace. As for the false assertion regarding "illegally issued" notices to airmen, it must be underlined that activities within the Ercan advisory airspace that require notices to airmen are carried out by the relevant authorities of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in accordance with article 3 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention).

Similarly, the claim in the letter regarding the Turkish Cypriot ports is also baseless, given the fact that the Greek Cypriot administration has no jurisdiction or right of say over Northern Cyprus. Furthermore, this claim ignores the present realities on the ground, namely, the existence of two independent self-governing States on the island of Cyprus, each exercising sovereignty and jurisdiction within its respective territory.

As to the repeated false allegations regarding Ercan Airport in the North, it should once again be underlined that the technologically up-to-date Ercan area control centre and airport in North Cyprus have been providing regular, reliable and safe air traffic services since the Greek Cypriot refusal in 1977 to provide air traffic services in the northern part of the island, in line with its isolation policy that has been imposed on the Turkish Cypriot people. Ever since, all flights within the sovereign airspace of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus have taken place with the full knowledge and permission of the Civil Aviation Department of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, over which the Greek Cypriot administration in South Cyprus has no jurisdiction or control. Furthermore, I would like to stress that the allegation regarding the interference of radiofrequencies is also totally baseless.

Moreover, the isolation imposed on the Turkish Cypriots, which the Greek Cypriot side attempts to perpetuate by encouraging the international community to deem all air and sea ports in Northern Cyprus "illegal", is in complete contravention of international law, as well as the call made by the then Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, in his report to the Security Council dated 28 May 2004 (S/2004/437), in which he clearly stated, "I would hope they [members of the Security Council] can give a strong lead to all States to cooperate both bilaterally and in international bodies to eliminate unnecessary restrictions and barriers that have the effect of isolating the Turkish Cypriots and impeding their development, deeming such a move as consistent with Security Council resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984)."

The legislation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus on aeronautical safety meets all standards and recommendations of the International Civil Aviation Organization, providing safe and swift navigation of aircraft landing at or taking off from Ercan Airport and using airspace of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. All airports in Northern Cyprus are in full conformity with international standards, and necessary investments have been made to keep up with developing technology. The number of air traffic controllers has been increased in accordance with the increasing number of flights over the years, and the Ercan area control centre is in regular and close cooperation with the Ankara area control centre in order to ensure the safe conduct of all flights in the region. In 2016 alone, the number of passengers who used Ercan Airport stood at 3,628,887, while this number is expected to be around 3,900,000 in 2017. Moreover, in 2016, 27,109 aircraft used Ercan Airport for arrival and departure and 210,789 aircraft used the Ercan advisory airspace, and these numbers are expected to be around 28,080 and 225,000, respectively, in 2017. In that regard, it must also be stressed that the Turkish Cypriot side is committed to upholding the highest standards in the field of air navigation safety in full conformity with the Chicago Convention of 1944 and that it is ready to cooperate with the Greek Cypriot authorities on this very important issue.

At a time when the comprehensive settlement negotiations are at a critical stage, I deem it necessary to stress the need to fully channel all our efforts towards achieving a just and lasting settlement of the Cyprus conflict in line with the established United Nations parameters and the Joint Declaration of 11 February 2014, which envisage a new partnership on the basis of the political equality of the two peoples of the island within the framework of a bizonal, bicommunal federation with two constituent States of equal status. Moreover, the Greek Cypriot administration should once again be reminded that its counterpart is, and always has been, the Turkish Cypriot side, not Turkey.

Availing myself of the present opportunity, I would like to call upon the Greek Cypriot side to discontinue such counterproductive and outdated rhetoric, which is not reflective of the joint vision and cooperation expressed by the leaders of both communities on the island since the resumption of the settlement talks in May 2015. As the two future partners on the island of Cyprus, we should never lose sight of the fact that the solution to the Cyprus problem will comprehensively deal with all pending issues between the two sides and thus focus all our efforts towards the ultimate goal of settlement.

Finally, I would like to reiterate that, as the Turkish Cypriot side, we are committed to maintaining our constructive and positive stance for a results-oriented negotiating process within the context of your good offices mission in Cyprus and encourage our Greek Cypriot neighbours to follow a similar path.

I should be grateful if the present letter could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 41, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mehmet **Dânâ**
Representative
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

United Nations A/71/975–S/2017/562

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.. General
7 July 2017
English
Original: Arabic

General Assembly
Seventy-first session
Agenda item 108
Measures to eliminate international terrorism

Security Council
Seventy-second year

Identical letters dated 29 June 2017 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, and further to previous letters regarding the Turkish regime's continued violations of the principles of international law and the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, its attacks against the sovereignty and territorial unity and integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic, its open support for terrorism and its threat to regional and international peace and security, as well as the failure of the Security Council to fulfil its responsibility to put an end to the Erdogan regime's attacks and crimes and to hold it accountable, I should like to convey to you the following information:

The Syrian Arab Republic reaffirms that the attacks by the Turkish regime and its armed forces against the sovereignty and territorial unity and integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic, including the building of the so-called barrier wall are illegal acts that constitute military aggression and a flagrant violation of international law and the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of friendly relations and good-neighbourliness among States, notwithstanding the flimsy arguments and pretexts by which that criminal regime seeks to justify its illegal practices.

The Erdogan regime's efforts to seize and confiscate parcels of Syrian territory and to build walls on it are null and void and their outcome cannot be recognized in any way whatsoever. Those efforts will not alter the legal status of those parcels of territory and the fact that they belong to the Syrian Arab Republic, nor will they undermine or take away the legal and sovereign rights of the Syrian Arab Republic.

The Syrian Arab Republic calls on the Security Council to fulfil its responsibility to maintain international peace and security, to compel the Turkish regime to halt its support for terrorism and its attacks against the sovereignty, territorial unity and integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic, and to hold that regime accountable.

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I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 108, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Louay **Falouh**
Minister Counsellor
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

United Nations A/71/976–E/2017/79

General Assembly
Economic and Social Council

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7 July 2017

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General Assembly
Seventy-first session
Agenda item 19
Sustainable development

Economic and Social Council
2017 session
28 July 2016-27 July 2017
Agenda items 5 (a) and 6

High-level segment: ministerial meeting of the high-level political forum on sustainable development, convened under the auspices of the Economic and Social Council

High-level political forum on sustainable development, convened under the auspices of the Economic and Social Council

Identical letters dated 7 July 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Economic and Social Council

I am writing in relation to the undue politicization of the voluntary national review of Azerbaijan at the high-level political forum on sustainable development in 2017.

Azerbaijan abused the highly important process of voluntary national reviews to disseminate a blatant distortion of the history and current state of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution. Blaming the neighbour for its inability to deliver on its own commitments, both domestically and internationally, has become a usual practice for the oil-rich but inefficiently governed Azerbaijan. However, the following examples demonstrate that it is Baku's miserable governance record that should be blamed for Azerbaijan's failure to take proper care of its population.

Currently, Azerbaijan depends on oil and gas for 95 per cent of its exports.[1] Amnesty International observes that Azerbaijan's oil-dependent economy was deeply affected by falling oil prices and the decline of its currency, the manat, by half of its value. Food prices rose without an equivalent rise in wages."[2] The World Bank, meanwhile, notes that "2016 marked a year of economic recession for Azerbaijan. ... Inflation rose to 15.6 per cent annually, driven mainly by devaluation of the manat and rising domestic food prices. Investment and consumption fell sharply due to a deep cut in public investment, banking sector distress and a drop in

[1] See https://www.ft.com/content/b74409b2-be99-11e4-8036-00144feab7de?mhq5j=e1.
[2] See https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/europe-and-central-asia/azerbaijan/report-azerbaijan/.

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real income."[3] It further notes that "current conditions do not appear conducive to significant poverty reduction".[3]

According to Freedom House, Azerbaijan remains "a deeply authoritarian State",[4] and recent years saw further aggressive steps from the executive to eliminate all criticism and dissent against a backdrop of mounting economic crisis.[4] The Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, an investigative reporting platform, contains dazzling records of the abuse of public funds by the ruling elite of Azerbaijan.[5]

Particularly dismal is Azerbaijan's human rights record. For example, Human Rights Watch delivers a forthright verdict: "Azerbaijan's government continues to wage a vicious crackdown on critics and dissenting voices. The space for independent activism, critical journalism and opposition political activity has been virtually extinguished by the arrests and convictions of many activists, human rights defenders and journalists, as well as by laws and regulations restricting the activities of independent groups and their ability to secure funding".[6]

In 2015, the Committee against Torture expressed deep concern that "torture and ill-treatment are routinely used by law enforcement and investigative officials, or with their instigation or consent, often to extract confessions or information to be used in criminal proceedings" (see CAT/C/AZE/CO/4, para. 8). Those practices constituted an abuse of authority and violated the rule of law with which Azerbaijan had agreed to comply.

The recent report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders lists the extensive systemic problems of Azerbaijan, identified during the Special Rapporteur's mission to Azerbaijan from 14 to 22 September 2016 (see A/HRC/34/52/Add.3). The report outlines serious drawbacks with regard to the civil society environment and the intensified crackdown to which it has been exposed. The political system is reported to be increasingly authoritarian, and corruption is widely perceived to be endemic and deeply institutionalized, permeating all spheres of public life, with entrenched political patronage networks and widespread conflicts of interest closely connected to the political elite. The Special Rapporteur is deeply concerned about the intimidation facing the families and relatives of defenders who carry out their activism from abroad, which in some cases has involved criminal charges being brought against those relatives. The report concludes that, "over the last several years, civil society in Azerbaijan has faced the worst situation since the country became independent" and that the Special Rapporteur was "alarmed to observe that human rights defenders increasingly operate in a rather criminalized and heavily constrained environment" (ibid., para. 111). Furthermore, the Special Rapporteur reports that "human rights defenders are increasingly at risk and do not feel safe because of increasingly restrictive legislation, the lack of access to justice and criminalizing actions by government authorities" (ibid., para. 114).

Recognizing that Azerbaijan's crackdown on civil society ran counter to its commitments, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, an international coalition promoting better governance of resource-rich countries, has suspended Azerbaijan's membership owing to its failure to comply with the Initiative's standards and the values to which it had committed itself.[7] It is the first time that the Initiative has taken this step against any country. Similarly, the steering committee

[3] See http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/187821492616164862/Azerbaijan-Snapshot-19Apr2017.pdf.
[4] See https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2016/azerbaijan.
[5] See https://www.occrp.org/en/corruptistan/azerbaijan/.
[6] See https://www.hrw.org/europe/central-asia/azerbaijan.
[7] See https://eiti.org/azerbaijan.

of the Open Government Partnership, a multilateral initiative aimed at securing concrete government commitments to strengthen transparency and governance, has voted to suspend Azerbaijan owing to unresolved core issues of concern, "specifically regarding constraints in the operating environment of non-governmental organizations".[8]

The number of pages of this letter would have to expand significantly to provide a record of the appalling corruption and human rights violations in Azerbaijan. Human rights organizations and anti-corruption groups, including Amnesty International[9] and Transparency International,[10] have repeatedly called for an independent investigation into suspicious money from Azerbaijan influencing decision-making in international forums. Recently, the Council of Europe has launched an investigation into a corruption scandal involving Azerbaijan.[11] This is yet another demonstration of Azerbaijan's deeply disturbing policies, representing a fundamental impediment to sustainable development in the country.

During the oil boom years, much of the new revenue was spent on extravagant projects and lavish shows of debatable importance.[12] "The military budget was increased to almost $4 billion a year, while other sectors — particularly those key to poverty alleviation and social welfare — received much less investment" (ibid.).

In its voluntary national review submissions, Azerbaijan yet again makes a deliberate attempt to deny responsibility for its policies. In order to conceal its monumental failures, the authorities of Azerbaijan opt for casting blame upon Armenia, propagating hatred towards Armenians in a convenient image of a "useful enemy". This is disingenuous and certainly not sustainable.

The policy of hatred and discrimination against the Armenians conducted in Azerbaijan at a government level has been consistently reported and brought to the attention of the international community. The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, an independent human rights monitoring body established by the Council of Europe, in its report published in 2016, says: "concerning the many instances of hate speech directed at Armenians it is obvious that they are part of a policy of hardening confrontation with regard to the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh".[13] The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, in its concluding observations of May 2016 on the reports of Azerbaijan, expresses concern at the repeated and unpunished use of inflammatory language by politicians regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and at its adverse impact on the public's view of ethnic Armenians (see CERD/C/AZE/CO/7-9, para. 27).

Armenia welcomes the unwavering and continued support of the United Nations system and the Secretary-General for the internationally agreed format of negotiations for the peaceful resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict under the auspices of the co-chairs of the Minsk Group of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Consolidated support for the negotiations by the international community is critical in deflecting attempts to pursue mediation

[8] See http://www.opengovpartnership.org/sites/default/files/attachments/OGPSteeringCommitteeResolutiononAzerbaijan-2.pdf.

[9] See https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur55/5556/2017/en/.

[10] See http://transparency.eu/coe-vote-buying/.

[11] See https://www.occrp.org/en/daily/6523-council-of-europe-begins-internal-corruption-probe-over-azerbaijan.

[12] See http://carnegieeurope.eu/2016/09/23/azerbaijan-at-twenty-five-new-era-of-change-and-turbulence-pub-64671.

[13] See http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/Country-by-country/Azerbaijan/AZE-CbC-V-2016-017-ENG.pdf.

shopping and lopsided interpretations of the causes and consequences of the conflict.

I request that the present letter be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 19, and of the Economic and Social Council under agenda items 5 (a) and 6, as well as an official document of the high-level political forum on sustainable development to be held from 10 to 19 July 2017.

(*Signed*) Zohrab **Mnatsakanyan**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations A/71/977–S/2017/589

General Assembly
Security Council

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10 July 2017

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General Assembly
Seventy-first session
Agenda item 61
Peacebuilding and sustaining peace

Security Council
Seventy-second year

Letter dated 10 July 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to enclose herewith a statement released by the spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) on 7 July 2017 with regard to the DPRK's successful test-fire of intercontinental ballistic rocket Hwasong-14 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 61, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **Ja** Song Nam
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Annex to the letter dated 10 July 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Statement by the spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 7 July 2017 with regard to the fact that the United States is pulling up the Democratic People's Republic of Korea over the successful test-fire of intercontinental ballistic rocket Hwasong-14

On 4 July 2017, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) successfully carried out the test-fire of intercontinental ballistic rocket Hwasong-14, which stands for the final gate to completing the State nuclear force.

The success of the test-fire of Hwasong-14 in just one go is a brilliant victory achieved by the army and people of the DPRK in their more than half-a-century-long anti-imperialist, anti-US showdown and a heroic deed that provided a reliable guarantee of the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula and the region.

However, the US is condemning the DPRK's test-fire as a "global threat" and is scheming to increase the international sanctions and pressure on the country to the top notch.

The DPRK makes it clear, once again, that its development of an intercontinental ballistic rocket is an option taken to defend itself by completely terminating the hostile policy and nuclear war threat of the US that have lasted for decades over the century.

There are several nuclear-weapon States in the world today, but the US is the one and only country that makes it its daily business to impose a constant nuclear threat upon the DPRK.

The issue of the DPRK's nukes and ballistic rocket is an issue confined to the DPRK and the US, and the test-fire of the intercontinental ballistic rocket conducted by the DPRK this time is a "gift package" addressed to none other than the US.

No other intercontinental-ballistic-missile States have been more transparent than the DPRK in the development and test-fire of an intercontinental ballistic rocket.

The DPRK officially announced that it would commence the development of an intercontinental ballistic rocket as it was the inevitable choice for the country to cope with the ever-increasing nuclear threat from the US, and it opened to the public the entire process of the combustion and static firing tests of the engine and the actual test-fire of the rocket, even sensitive information, such as tactical and technical data and specifications.

That is because the DPRK's intercontinental ballistic rocket is an unquestionable nuclear war deterrent that is fundamentally different from the military equipment for aggressive war developed in strict confidence by the US with the wild ambition to dominate the world by means of surprise attacks on other nations.

Nevertheless, the US is branding the DPRK's legitimate and righteous measure for self-defence as a "global threat" and calling for "global action" against it. This is an explicit illustration of Trump's "America First Policy" that seeks its own interests by sacrificing others.

The mentality of the mugger that tries to engage the entire world in opposing a sovereign State for the reason that the State has incurred its displeasure will never find acceptance among any sensible people and independent countries.

The complete success of the test-fire of intercontinental ballistic rocket Hwasong-14 significantly enhanced the efficiency of the DPRK's nuclear force as a war deterrent, thereby more reliably ensuring peace and security in and around the Korean Peninsula.

Now that the DPRK's capability to strike the very heart of the US at any given time has been physically proved, the US will find it more difficult to dare to attack the DPRK.

Herein lies the global historic significance of the measures taken by the DPRK that have strengthened the powerful nuclear war deterrence in every dimension in pursuance of the new line of simultaneously developing the two fronts in the face of persistent pressure and sanctions by the hostile forces.

This is the only way to defend oneself and safeguard the dignity of the nation in the present hostile world where the law of the jungle prevails.

It is high time that the US completely reoriented its strategic viewpoint on the DPRK, and it should give up its hostile policy against the latter and put a definite end to its nuclear threat and blackmail without further delay.

As has been declared by respected Supreme Leader Comrade Kim Jong Un, the DPRK will neither put its nukes and ballistic missiles on the negotiating table in any case nor flinch even an inch from the road of bolstering its nuclear force unless the hostile policy and nuclear threat of the US against the DPRK are thoroughly eradicated.

The US will receive more "gift packages" of different sizes from the DPRK in endless succession, as it tries harder to destroy, by means of sanctions and pressure, the overall national power and strategic position of the DPRK, which have been drastically boosted.